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Stimulating Recruitment of Female 
Managers 
Maurice D. Levi 
In order to induce firms to feel indiffèrent towards the 
sexes in their recruitment for the administrative level, the 
cause of préférence towards maies must be eliminated. In 
this paper the author discusses the préférence for maies that 
arise out of expected lower turnover for maie employées. 
The reluctance of employers to recruit women into their admini-
strative ranks has concerned women's libération organizations, Fédéral 
and Provincial Governments and the courts. Despite the attention that 
the problem has received no suggestions hâve been made which would 
involve making employées indiffèrent towards the sex of a candidate 
for an administrative position. In order to induce firms to fell indiffèr-
ent towards the sexes in their recruitment for the administrative levels 
we must eliminate the cause of préférence towards maies. This cannot 
be accomplished by législative action. It can only be achieved by tackl-
ing the cause of the problem. This paper suggests a scheme that would 
attempt to do this. 
THE PROBLEM CONSIDERED 
We will concentrate our discussion on the préférence for maies 
that arises out of expected lower turnover of maie employée.1 We will 
thus be ignoring any préférence for maies that arises out of a feeling 
by employers that, for example, 
other workers resent taking in-
structions from a female or from 
LEVI, M.D., Faculty of Commerce 
and Business Administration, Uni-
versity of British Columbia. 
* I hâve benefitted from the comments of the referrees on an earlier draft of 
this paper and from discussion with Kristen Monroe. 
1
 Some of the arguments contained in this paper and further implications of 
turnover rates for the employment of women can be found in D. Parsons, «Spécifie 
Human Capital: Layoffs and Quits», unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chi-
cago, 1970, and E. Landes, «Male-Female Différences in Wages and Employment: A 
Spécifie Human Capital Model», National Bureau of Economie Research, Working Pa-
per 27, Jan. 1974. 
STIMULATING RECRUITMENT OF FEMALE MANAGERS 73 
the feeling that women are unable to handle a crisis.2 We will, how-
ever, show that it is possible that the particularly strong préférence 
for maies as managers relative to other occupations could well occur 
as a resuit of lower turnover and that we do not hâve to invoke thèse 
other possible causes of préférence to explain the phenomenon.3 We 
will also see that if préférence is given to maies because they are likely 
to stay with a firm for a longer period, then a rather simple type of 
scheme may be successful. This will involve training cost repayaient 
clauses in job contracts.4 
THE IMPORTANCE OF TRAINING COSTS 
Many firms, if questioned on their reluctance to hire women for 
the administrative ranks, will argue that women are likely to leave when 
they marry or begin a family. They might well admit that there are wom-
en who would either not marry or else remain after marriage or while 
having their family, but they will argue that there is no way of select-
ing thèse women from those who would readily leave the firm. As a 
conséquence, the determined career woman suffers from being grouped 
with her less determined « sisters ». 
If we ask why firms prefer their employées to remain with them 
for some time we will see why préférence for maies might be particu-
larly strong in recruitment for administrative positions. We will also 
see that a rather simple change in job contracts suggests itself for remov-
ing this préférence. 
2
 Elimination of préférence resulting from thèse types of reasons would require 
a différent treatment than is described in this paper. What would be required is a direct 
subsidy to firms for hiring women as managers. A policy is probably necessary only 
because of equal-pay rulings or the fear of thèse rulings. If a firm could pay a woman 
sufficiently less than a man to compensate for the lower psychic évaluation or for the 
higher expected turnover of a woman, employment prospects of women would be en-
hanced. 
3
 We do not mean to suggest that thèse other socio-psychological explanations 
are unimportant. Instead, we wish merely to point out the theoretical possibility that 
the scarcity of women in administrative ranks vs. jobs with less «spécifie on the job 
training», could well resuit from turnover alone, and to suggest a possible solution to 
this cause of discrimination. 
4
 The purpose of our discussion is not to describe a scheme that will reduce 
turnover rates. Indeed, reduced turnover may not increase overall efficiency See E.E. 
LAWLER III, Pay and Organizational Effectiveness: A Psychological View, New York, 
McGraw-Hill, 1971. We wish only to présent a scheme that will eliminate the préférence 
for maies on account of perceived différences in turnover rates between the sexes. 
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It is likely that a new recruit for a management position will re-
quire training in his new job. Indeed, many firms establish lengthy train-
ing programs for their management trainees. This training is often pro-
vided to give higher ranking employées an overview of the opérations 
of the type of firm they hâve joined or the industry they are within. 
For example, many of the larger banks will hâve their employées fa-
miliarized with the functions of the various divisions within a bank and 
perhaps even with the principles of banking. Manufacturing firms may 
wish their managers to know something of the techniques employed 
in the production, marketing and distribution of their product. And even 
if no formai arrangements are made for providing this type of training, 
expérience on the job will provide a new recruit with a large part of 
the knowledge that a program would offer. Much of this type of train-
ing and even some of the training in the position the new recruit fills, 
will be of gênerai value to the employée in that it will be useful in oth-
er firms than in which the knowledge was acquired. We can hence call 
this gênerai on-the-job training. 
In addition to this type of knowledge an employée must also be-
come familiar with the tasks he has to perform and the way thèse are 
to be done in the firms within which he works. This type of training is 
of spécifie value to the firm within which it was acquired and will be 
of no value to other firms even within the same industry. We can hence 
call this spécifie on-the-job training.5 
It is possible that the knowledge that is required by an employée 
to perform his job efficiently could be acquired at the expense of eith-
er the employée himself or by the employer. The employée would gen-
erally meet the costs by accepting an initial low wage while the training 
was acquired. The employer would generally meet the costs by either 
direct outlays on instruction if the training is formai or by paying the 
new recruit a wage above his productivity while he was informally 
acquiring the knowledge. 
To the extent that it is the employer who meets the costs of 
training, he will suffer a capital loss when an employée leaves. In oth-
er words, he would not obtain as large a return from his investment 
in the worker's training as is otherwise possible.6 The rate of return 
might even be négative. It is for this reason that a firm is concerned 
5
 The distinction between gênerai and spécifie on-the-job training and many of 
the arguments that follow can be found in Gary Becker's extensive study, Human Capital, 
New York, Columbia University Press, 1964. 
6
 The returns occur by paying wages that are eventually less than productivity. 
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with the turnover of its employées.7 We must thus détermine if, and 
under what circumstances, the firm will meet any of the training costs 
of its employées. When we do this we will see that there is a particular 
category of training that is currently acquired at the employer's expense 
and that this is the type of training that is so important for management 
trainees. 
If we follow the distinction made earlier and divide the knowledge 
that must be acquired into that which is of use also to other firms, i.e., 
from gênerai on-the-job training, and that which is of use only to the 
firm accepting the new employée, i.e., from spécifie on-the-job training, 
we will see that firms will pay for some part of only the spécifie on-the-
job training and for none of the gênerai training. 
As knowledge that is useful also to other firms is acquired and 
the productivity of the employée increases from it, other firms will be 
prepared to offer higher wages to attract that employée. In order to 
retain him a firm would hâve to compensate him fully for his higher 
productivity. If it failed to do so the worker would soon leave for anoth-
er firm where he would receive full compensation for his greater worth. 
Thus with gênerai training, wages will hâve to increase by as much 
as the productivity of the employée. There would hence be no gain 
to a firm for paying for such training. The benefit would accrue to the 
individual receiving the training and he would hâve to pay the cost. 
As we noted, the cost would be borne by receiving lower wages while 
undergoing training than would be received in a position that did not 
require any additional knowledge.8 
Training that is of use only to the firm in which it is acquired, i.e., 
spécifie training, will be paid for by the firm as well as by the employée. 
As such knowledge is acquired the productivity of the worker in increas-
ed only in the firm where it was acquired. Consequently, wages will 
7
 In restricting the costs to those of training we are assuming that when con-
sidering a particular applicant, a firm thinks of its future recruitment costs, i.e., the costs 
of searching for and selecting a new employée, as being invariant to the expected per-
manence of this applicant. 
8
 If there was a reluctance to change jobs after settling in, say as a resuit of 
Personal contacts made or because the worker would hâve to move his home, some of the 
costs of gênerai training might be borne by the firm. This is because wages would then 
not hâve to increase by as much as productivity in order to retain the employée. A gain 
would hence remain to the firm which would make it worthwhile bearing some of the 
cost of training. In this case we can argue that even gênerai training is a cause of préfér-
ence for a lengthy expected stay of an employée and hence a potential reason for pref-
erring a maie. 
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not hâve to be raised to retain this employée; compétition from other 
firms to attract the employée with higher wages will not occur. Thus 
when a firm invests in spécifie knowledge it can expect a return from 
its investment — productivity of the employée can increase without 
this being lost through higher wages. Firms will thus be prepared to pay 
for this type of training. 
But it is not the best alternative for the firm to pay ail the cost 
of training of this type. It will be better for the firm to actually raise 
wages when knowledge is acquired. In this way it will give the employée 
an incentive not to leave as he could not obtain as high a wage else-
where. But if wages were higher after training when no training costs 
were to be incurred by the employée, there would be an excess supply 
of candidates for the jobs. The firm will hence realize that it can share 
the cost with the employée and still obtain sufficient recruits. We would 
not, however, find the worker bearing ail the cost of spécifie training 
for he would not receive full compensation for it if he decided or was 
forced to leave. Thus with spécifie training we can argue that part of 
the training will be paid for by the employer.9 Thus a firm will incur 
capital losses when a worker quits only if that worker required spécifie 
on-the-job training when he joined the firm. No capital losses are incurr-
ed if the worker required gênerai on-the-job training. 
Management and other administrative positions generally require 
much spécifie training. A management trainee may hâve to spend a con-
sidérable amount of time just to become familiar with the features of 
the firm he is within.10 He will hâve to learn who is responsible for 
particular functions and how his firm perforais thèse functions. It may 
be perhaps a couple of years before a newly hired manager is sufficient-
ly skilled and confident with this type of knowledge to do his job 
smoothly and become a valuable asset to the company. We can thus 
claim that spécifie training costs are particularly important at the man-
agement level. Since thèse are the only training costs which are met, 
although partially, by the firm, then if firms expect higher turnover of 
women we can explain why préférence for maies is so particularly 
strong in thèse ranks. At lower ranks less of the training will be spé-
cifie and hence less of the training will be met by the firm. Lower 
ranks will also require less training in total. Thus smaller capital losses 
9
 For a fuller discussion of this proposition see Becker, Human Capital, pp. 
18-29. 
10
 As Alfred Marshall put it, he will require «an acquaintance with men and 
things [which are]... of a kind to be of no value save to the business in which he already 
is...». A. MARSHALL, Principle of Economies, 8 th éd. New York, 1949, p. 626. 
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are imposed if such a worker quits. In conséquence, little value will 
be placed on the expected permanence of an employée.11 We can hence 
claim that we do not hâve to invoke arguments that firms think women 
are unable to efficiently perform the management function in order to 
explain the relatively greater préférence for maies at the management 
level. We can explain it, at least theoretically, purely in terms of train-
ing costs. 
THE EFFECT OF A REPAYMENT OF TRAINING COSTS CONTRACT 
The above discussion should make it clear why firms will show 
préférence for maies in their recruitment décisions for the management 
levels. If they believe that there would be a lower turnover of maies 
as a resuit of voluntary quits they will expect to face greater capital 
losses if they recruit any women.12 
Now, if we can devise a scheme which will remove the capital 
losses associated with a quit then it should be clear that such a scheme 
would resuit in no value being placed on the expected turnover of a 
prospective employée. Then, if women are currently not hired because 
of the suspicion that they will leave, such a scheme should be very 
effective in improving the recruitment prospects of women. It would 
eventually resuit in women taking a more proportionate share in the 
management and administration of business. The outcome would not 
be the resuit of tokenism. 
If firms could bind employées to remain it would remove the risk 
of capital losses that would lead to a préférence for maies. However, 
it has proved to be very difficult to bind an employée to a contractural 
obligation to remain with a firm; the courts hâve considered such con-
tracts as resulting in involuntary servitude. And in any case, an em-
ployée who is forced to remain is likely to put very little into his job. 
But what can be done in the absence of such contracts ? 
11
 If we consider différent positions up the hierarchy of a firm we can employ 
out intuition to see how more and more value is attached to turnover as we proceed 
upwards. For example, little concern is given to the expected permanence of a new dish-
washer or cleaner (and wages do not increase with seniority to reduce the risk of them 
leaving). Somewhat more concern would be given to expected permanence of say a sales 
assistant or secretary (and wages would increase to retain them) etc. 
12
 It should be apparent that it is the same costs that also explain why many 
firms are reluctant to employ very capable university and collège students during their 
summer vacations and why those who do take summer help prefer to take back in later 
summer students that they hâve already employ éd. It should also be clear why students 
are given part-time and summer positions that require very little spécifie knowledge. 
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We hâve said that a firm will not mind that it cannot ensure 
that an employée will stay provided we can remove the capital loss 
it would face if the employée quits. This would be achieved by a dif-
férent type of contract. The contract that is required would not bind 
an employée to stay. Rather, it would bind the employée who leaves 
to compensate the firm for the capital loss if suffers when the employée 
quits. This would mean repaying ail of the costs of training incurred 
by the firm that the worker has not already repaid by the work he has 
done.13 Such a contract which would be signed when the employée 
joined the firm would remove the préférence for types of individuals 
with a low turnover and as we shall see, it will also work to the benefit 
of the employée, employer and society. 
Since the repayment would equal the amount of training costs that 
were not recovered by the employer from the work that was done (i.e., 
by eventual productivity exceeding wages), the repayment would ini-
tially increase with the amount of time the employée had remained. 
But as the employée begins to dévote more of his time with greater ef-
ficiency to his job, he will be «repaying» the firm for more of the train-
ing costs it had incurred. Thus after some point the repayment would 
diminish. The employee's obligation might then, for example, be to 
contract at the time of hiring to repay say, $2,000 if he or she left with-
in three months, $2,500 if he or she left within six months, $1,500 if 
within a year, $700 if within 18 months etc. The actual amounts will 
dépend upon the extent of training costs that are incurred by the firm 
and would be determined at the time of hiring in the same way that 
wages are currently determined.14 We could présent many arguments 
in favor of such a contract. Before doing this we can note that under 
such a scheme employers would bear ail of the cost of spécifie train-
ing.15 
13
 Included in the costs should be the return on the firm's investment in train-
ing. 
14
 We will return to the détermination of the reimbursement scale shortly. At 
this point we should note that the amount would also dépend upon the pension plan 
associated with the job. With no vesting, the repayments that would be contracted would 
be reduced by the accumulation in the plan. Employées will be prepared to repay the 
extent of their training costs less that lost through the pension plan and employers would 
accept that amount since they would gain that lost in pension by the employée. 
15
 The firm would also be prepared to pay the cost of gênerai training if the 
employée contracted to repay this cost too if he quit. This would be determined by the 
préférence of the employée at the time of hiring and would dépend upon whether he pref-
erred a lower initial wage without an obligation to repay the costs of gênerai training to 
a higher initial wage with an obligation to repay. 
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We hâve already explained why firms and employées currently 
share the expense of training for job spécifie knowledge. The explana-
tion involved the argument that firms would not pay ail of the expenses 
of training because by allowing the employée to bear some of the cost 
there would be an incentive for him to stay. The employée would re-
ceive a higher wage after training than he could obtain with another 
firm. 
Now if the employée contracts to repay the costs incurred by the 
firm then there would be no reason for the firm to offer an incentive 
to keep the employée i.e., by offering him higher wages after training. 
The firm would not lose if the employée decided to leave. Consequent-
ly it would be prepared to pay ail of the cost of spécifie training.16 The 
employée would not be prepared to pay any of thé cost of spécifie train-
ing while working. He would know that the firm would hâve no reason 
to induce him to remain and hence to offer a wage after training that 
would be higher than he could obtain elsewhere. There would thus be 
no expected return to investing in his own training. Thus the employer 
would hâve to bear ail of the cost of training and would be prepared 
to do this knowing that he would be reimbursed in the event of quit.17 
Now, what arguments can be made for the contract we hâve described 
apart from that it would remove préférence for maies on account of 
turnover ? 
Only those individuals sincerely interested in making a career 
would sign. Workers who had no real intention of remaining would not 
contract to pay for training which would be of no value when they 
leave. They would instead seek positions requiring less spécifie train-
ing. Thus by selecting those that sign contracts, firms would be selecting 
from amongst their female applicants for management positions those 
women who would intend to remain if they were to marry or hâve chil-
dren. Indeed, there would be a strong incentive to remain, an incentive 
which would increase with the extent of the costs of training incurred 
by the firm and hence to be repaid in the event of a quit. 
The contracts would not hâve to be limited to women. Firms 
could write up contracts with maie employées too. The terms of the 
16
 The firm would hence obtain the return. 
17
 If the employée could obtain a contract that promised a higher wage after 
training was completed if he were to bear the cost of training, then the employée might 
be preapred to pay some of the training costs if it fully reduced the sum he had to repay 
if he was to leave. However, firms are unlikely to promise wages sufficiently far into the 
future to make this outeome likely. 
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contract would be exactly similar provided the same costs were incurr-
ed in the training and recruitment of both sexes. They would thus not 
lead to claims of discrimination.18 
Economie theory teaches us that wages will equal the marginal 
revenue product of labour. No firms has to make the complex calcula-
tion of the product to détermine the wage. The wage paid is that in 
the market or else the firm cannot prevent an employée from going to 
another firm. Similarly no firm will hâve to compute the training cost 
schedule. Where similar positions are available in other firms, the sched-
ule can be «read» from the market. Put differently, we would not hâve 
to fear that firms would use those contracts to extract extravagent pay-
ments from new employées. No one would go to work for a firm which 
made excessive demands. Job hunters would « shop-around » and weigh 
up wages and the potential demands in choosing the firm they will 
join. If employment were terminated at the request of the firm, then 
reimbursement could be prevented.19 
The individual sincerely interested in a career with the firm would 
not loose by having to sign an obligation to repay his or her training 
costs. The firm would pay the costs and thèse would never hâve to be 
repaid. Indeed, the sincère individual would gain because firms, for the 
same training costs, would be prepared to pay better wages to those 
employées who sign than when contracts are not employed ; they would 
know they would not lose the training costs that are involved.20 The 
18
 Firms might expect to collect on average more repayments from women if 
they continued to remain for shorter durations despite the cost of doing so, but the 
scale of repayment would be the same as for maies — provided only that the côsts of 
training were the same. 
19
 This is the only part of the scheme that would necessarily require surveillance 
— even if it was required that such a provision was written into the contract. Surveillance 
would be required to help ensure that employées did not try and induce firms to lay 
them off by working poorly so as to avoid compensating the firm for the training costs. 
We might note that a case might be made for reimbursement to be made by the em-
ployée even if employment was terminated by the firm. Such a scheme would make firms 
prepared to take « risks » on appointing management trainess and hence try racial minority 
group members etc., knowing there is no loss to them if they turn out to be poor managers. 
The arguments behind this would require too much explanation to enter into it this paper. 
20
 More generally, the sincère individual would gain by having his training costs 
fall by more than wages, i.e., since the training costs met by the employée would décline, 
so might his wage and yet he would still corne out ahead. For the same training costs, 
the «présent value» of wages over the new expected permanence of employées would 
increase by up to the «présent value» of capital losses that firms currently incur. Wages 
would increase still more if firms currently plan on a return to bearing the risk of spécifie 
training investment. 
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firms would also gain for they would no longer face a capital loss when 
an employée quits. And society would gain by making insincere candi-
dates for jobs requiring spécifie training realize the extent of the costs 
they are imposing — they would no longer ignore when deciding to 
quit the training costs that are currently met by the firm. The external-
ity would be internalised with the employée realising the full social 
cost of his act. The consumer would eventually benefit via lower priées 
by the saving of the society's resources from being devoted to the train-
ing of individuals who would not use their training. 
Now it is likely that if employées contract to repay spécifie train-
ing costs, then they will seek and find insurance companies that are 
prepared to accept the obligation to repay the firms in return for a 
regular premium payment. If employées did seek cover in this way it 
would not remove any of the advantages of the repayment contract that 
we described. Employers would still be indiffèrent towards turnover 
and not prefer maies on that basis. Employées would still hâve an 
incentive not to quit if they intended working for some other establis-
ment and not leave the job market ; the incentive would be in the form 
of facing lower insurance premiums in the future. The insurance would 
be available to both men and women and the repayment scales would 
still be simply contracted between employées and employers at the time 
of hiring with an incentive for the employée to minimize the repayment 
obligation for a given wage so as to minimize the premium payments.21 
We might note that by the scale of their opération, the insurance com-
panies would develop an expertise and learn the characteristics that 
reveal a sincère and determined career seeker in a way that a firm could 
not do. The premiums would then vary with such «risk» factors as 
the âge of the job candidate, their previous (j°b) expérience etc., in 
the same way that auto insurance premiums dépend on thèse same vari-
ables.22 
21
 The premiums would be higher for women if they had a higher turnover even 
with an incentive not to quit. In fact, the turnover of women would probably increase 
relatively to that of men. This is because when women quit they often leave the job 
market altogether and the prospect of higher future insurance premiums would not there-
fore be a disincentive. 
22
 The expected présent value of the premiums for each risk class of insurers 
would equal the présent value of the expected repayments to the firms plus a normal 
rate of profit on the enterprise. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
Repayment of training cost contracts, despite their advantages, 
are unlikely to arise without some encouragement.23 This could be 
achieved with only partial loss of some of the advantages of the scheme, 
by the government promising to share the obligation to repay train-
ing costs with the employée or the insurance premiums that covers 
this obligation. Alternatively, the government could enter the insurance 
business itself charging full or subsidized premiums. Considération of 
such a policy might suggest that its potential was greater than the « pres-
sure» techniques employed to improve the recruitment prospects of 
women. 
Des moyens de stimuler le recrutement des femmes dans les 
postes administratifs 
La rareté relative de femmes dans les fonctions administratives peut s'expliquer, 
au moins théoriquement, par le haut roulement de la main-d'œuvre féminine. L'article 
ci-dessus veut démontrer pourquoi il en est ainsi et également proposer un plan qui éli-
minerait la discrimination contre les candidates à des fonctions administratives à cause 
du taux de roulement de la main-d'œuvre féminine. L'auteur soutient que le plan qu'il 
préconise servirait à la fois les travailleurs, les employeurs et la collectivité. 
Les entreprises ne se préoccupent du taux des départs que dans la mesure où elles 
ont engagé des capitaux dans la formation de leur personnel. Si nous divisons la for-
mation interne en deux catégories, la formation générale et la formation spécialisée, 
nous y verrons que l'entreprise sera perdante lorsque l'employé démissionne uniquement 
dans le cas où celui-ci avait besoin d'un entraînement d'un type spécial. 
La formation interne générale implique l'acquisition, en milieu de travail, de con-
naissances qui valent aussi pour les autres entreprises. Une fois celles-ci acquises et que 
la productivité s'est accrue, d'autres entreprises seront désireuses d'offrir un traitement 
plus élevé à l'employé pour l'attirer chez elles. Étant donné que le salaire devrait être 
augmenté proportionnellement à la hausse de productivité du travailleur, il n'y a aucun 
intérêt pour un employeur à dépenser en vue de la formation de son personnel. Les avan-
tages en reviendraient à la personne qui a acquis l'expérience et elle devrait avoir à en 
défrayer le coût en recevant au départ un bas salaire alors qu'elle se trouve en quelque 
sorte à l'apprentissage. 
La formation interne spécialisée implique que l'acquisition des connaissances 
ne vaut que pour l'entreprise où elle a été obtenue. Au fur et à mesure que l'employé 
23
 There are a couple of examples of repayment obligations like that described 
in this paper. The Royal Canadian Mounted Police, for example, require recruits that quit 
to pay compensation at a rate based on the number of months remaining to be served on 
their first appointment. 
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se familiarise avec son travail, sa productivité ne s'accroît que s'il demeure chez son 
employeur. Par conséquent, il ne sera pas nécessaire d'en augmenter le traitement pour 
en retenir les services. Il n'y aura aucune pression des entreprises voisines pour l'at-
tirer en lui offrant davantage. Donc, lorsqu'une entreprise engage des capitaux dans la 
formation interne spécialisée, elle peut espérer en retirer un profit et elle sera disposée 
dans une certaine mesure à en défrayer le coût. Elle offrira au départ un traitement su-
périeur à la productivité de l'employé. En réalité, la firme imposera ainsi à son employé 
une part du coût de sa formation spécialisée et lui permettra, par ailleurs, de tirer profit 
de cet investissement plus tard sous forme d'incitations à rester à son service. 
Les postes administratifs exigent d'ordinaire passablement de connaissances spécia-
lisées. Il peut s'écouler plusieurs mois avant qu'un nouvel employé soit assez familier 
avec le fonctionnement d'une entreprise pour devenir un administrateur efficace. Il lui 
faut acquérir beaucoup de connaissances variées. En conséquence, nous devons nous 
attendre à trouver moins de femmes dans la hiérarchie administrative que dans les 
postes de rang inférieur où la formation qu'ils exigent est plutôt de caractère général. 
S'il est possible de mettre au point un plan qui puisse éviter les pertes découlant 
d'un départ, nous éliminerons la prérérence qui est accordée aux hommes par suite du 
roulement de la main-d'œuvre. Un plan apte à réaliser un tel objectif consisterait dans 
le remboursement du contrat d'apprentissage ou de formation. Un semblable contrat, 
conclu au moment de l'engagement, garantirait le remboursement à l'entreprise du coût 
de la formation selon une échelle tout comme les salaires sont ainsi fixés. Le rembour-
sement serait élevé au départ, puis irait en diminuant suivant la durée de service de 
l'employé. Il équivaudrait aux coûts de la formation encourus par l'employeur que le 
travailleur n'a pas déjà remis par le travail qu'il a exécuté à un traitement moindre que 
sa productivité. 
Ainsi protégé par le contrat de remboursement du coût de la formation, l'entre-
prise serait prête à en payer tous les frais. Tel qu'il a été exposé précédemment, l'em-
ployeur ferait d'abord assumer à l'employé une partie du coût de la formation spécia-
lisée qui, par la suite, profiterait de cet investissement sous forme d'incitations à ne 
pas abandonner son emploi. Si, cependant, l'entreprise devait être complètement rem-
boursée advenant le départ, il n'y aurait aucune raison d'offrir d'incitations à l'employé 
pour qu'il reste à son service non plus qu'à ne lui charger le paiement que d'une partie 
de sa formation spécialisée. 
En outre de faire disparaître la préférence qui est accordée aux hommes à cause 
du roulement, le contrat de remboursement du coût de la formation servirait les em-
ployeurs, les travailleurs et la société. Les entreprises y^gagneraient parce qu'elles n'au-
raient plus à absorber des pertes advenant le départ de l'employé. L'individu loyal y 
gagnerait en touchant au départ un traitement plus élevé du fait que les employeurs se-
raient disposés à absorber le coût total de la formation spécialisée. La collectivité y ga-
gnerait aussi en ce que cette formule ferait comprendre aux candidats peu sérieux l'im-
portance du coût qu'exige leur formation. Ils n'ignoreraient plus s'ils décidaient de par-
tir ce qu'il en a coûté à l'entreprise pour les former. L'employé se rendrait compte du 
coût social de son comportement et, éventuellement, le consommateur y trouverait à 
son tour profit par l'abaissement des prix consécutif à l'épargne des ressources de la 
communauté qui sont consacrés à la formation d'individus qui n'utilisent pas pleinement 
la formation qu'ils ont acquise. 
